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CAPITALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: 
A CRITICAL ESSAY 
By Sara Berry 
Poverty and underdevelopment are pervasive features of contemporary African 
economic life. After two decades of independence from colonial rule, the majority 
of African nations still rank among the poorest in the world. Even in those 
countries which have experiences rapid aggregate rates of growth, the majority 
of the population has remained poor--either because they have little or no access 
to sectors of expanding opportunity, or because their gains in income and assets 
have been eroded by rising inflation and shortages of essential goods. For most 
Africans, the promises of the first two Development Decades remain to be fulfilled. 
How far can the persistence of poverty in postcolonial Africa be explained 
in terms of the failure--or success--of capitalist development there? Ideological 
differences account for some but not all of the debate over this issue. Writers 
in the neoclassical tradition tend, for example, to regard capitalism as progressive 
in principle, although some are less sanguine than others about the actual prospects 
for realizing significant capitalist development in Africa. Radical scholars 
agree that capitalism creates human misery and ought ultimately to be replaced 
by socialism, but they are divided over the role that capitalism itself will play 
in the transformation process. Proponents of the "dependency" approach argue 
that underdevelopment in Africa is a consequence of its incorporation into the 
world capitalist system. Exploitation by more advanced capitalist societies has 
relegated most of sub-Saharan Africa to a dependent and peripheral position in 
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the world economy, foreclosing the possibility that .African economies might 
undergo a period of vigorous, self-sustaining capitalist expansion. Others 
follow the "orthodox" marxist view that capitalism, like adolescence, is both 
inevitable and in the long run progressive: that its laws of motion will lead, 
in Africa as elsewhere, to development of the productive forces, to economic· 
crises and to class conflict which will eventually serve to bring about the 
transition to socialism. 
Like free market neoclassicists, orthodox marxists lean towards economic 
determinism: capitalism - or market forces - ultimately shape the course 
of history. The dependency school, on the other hand, shares with what might 
be called the neo-Keynesian tradition of development economics the view that capital-
ism doesn't always work. Both the dependency writers and the neo-Keynesians 
conclude that massive political intervention is a precondition for economic 
"take-off" in the Third World, though they hold opposite views of the form such 
intervention must take. In contrast, both marxist-leninists and conservative 
neoclaas:i_c:ists tend to argue that government is best which most effectively 
advances the economic forces- shaping social history--class struggle and the 
"invisible hand", respectively. 
Whatever one's opinion of the relative merits of these four approaches, 
one thing emerges clearly from an overview of the development literature--
namely, that understanding the form and consequences of capitalist development 
in Africa is a problem in political economy. Accordingly, after reviewing the 
major assumptions of each approach and pointing out some of their limitations 
for explaining African development patterns, I will touch briefly on attempts 
by several Africanist scholars to clarify the relations between production, 
accumulation and domination in the development process by analyzing them in 
specific historical contexts. Much of this discussion is informed by recent 
marxist efforts to "rethink"_the problem of the state in relation to capitalist 
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and/or precapitalist economies, but the analysis of particular societies in 
historical perspective involves more than just the mechanical application 
of theoretical constructs to sets of empirical data. The case study approach, 
which has long provided some of the best available descriptions of African 
social change, is perhaps beginning to yield better conceptual frameworks as 
well--a point I shall try to support in the concluding section of this paper 
by referring to a couple of specific cases. 
"Capitalism is good for you ... " 
The most enthusiastic proponents of this view hold that capitalism is 
progressive under almost any circumstances. As long as people are "willing" 
to make more money, they will tend to produce as much as they can as cheaply 
as possible -- thereby using society's scarce resource efficiently -- now and in 
the future. Moreover, while monopoly power can and sometimes does interfere 
with efficient resource allocation and/or the expansion of productive capacity, 
in the long run concentrations of economic power tend to break down--except 
where necessary to realize technical economies of scale--under the combined 
impact of technical progress and competition. (Becker) In the long run, capitalism 
is likely to prevail as the dominant economic mode--in Africa as elsewhere. 
In the meantime, development strategy should seek to minimize political "dis-
tortions" of market incentives in order to release the progressive forces 
inherent in the self-interest of African producers and consumers, In practice, 
this means allowing world market prices to guide domestic resource allocation; 
limiting government economic intervention to the provision of infrastructure 
and information; and leaving it to African producers to maximize social welfare 
through individual self-aggrandisement. 
In support of their views, neoclassical writers po·int to dozens of decision-
making studies which purport to demonstrate the rationality of economic actors 
in all climes and cultures. They cite the repeated failure of state-planned 
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and/or managed development schemes as evidence that so~ial rationality dictates 
the "release" of the productive potential of individual rationality by promoting 
market competition. Michael Lofchie put the case in a characteristically lucid 
and arresting manner when he suggested that state-imposed agrarian socialism 
failed in Tanzania not just because it was premature and poorly managed, but 
because Tanzanian peasants prefer capitalism. (JMAS, 1978) If bureaucrats too 
act rationally--and the neoclassical theory implies that they will·- then the 
state itself can be seen as essentially another market inwhich, sooner or later, 
the pursuit of self-interest will lead to the greatest good for the greatest 
number. Such views underlie a substantial body of writing on African development, 
ranging from assertions that corruption is economically efficient to Bob Bates' 
recent claim that official sanctions for racial discrimination in markets for 
land, labor and agricultural produce in colonial Kenya should be seen as an expected 
and historically progressive outcome of the settlers' superior skills as political 
lobbyists. (Bates & Lofchie) 
The fallacies in this approach may be listed quickly, Decision-making research 
provides no proof of generalized individual rationality. If empirical data prove 
inconsistent with the hypothesis of profit maximization, researchers either 
redefine the "objective function" until. it provides a statistically significant/-ex post 
rational'ization of observed behavior, or fall back on the empiricist's lament 
that it's nearly impossible to obtain accurate measurements of costs and expected 
returns to every option which might be considered by the decision-makers--
a complaint which is both justified and demonstrates the inevitable inconclusiveness 
of the whole decision-making approach to the study of social change, (Berry, 1980). 
In the example cited above, it is not clear whether Tanzania's agrarian crisis 
of 1973/74 was due to declining production or to decreased state procurements 
of ~aize--let alone what Tanzanian peasants really think about capitalism, 
Nor can we assume that social trends may be accurately represented by weighted 
sums of·individual behaviors. There is no reason to assume that Tanzanian 
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peasants deliberately reduced output (and hence their own consumption) in the 
face of accelerated villugization--though they may well have held maize off 
the market, as peasants have done in other times and places to protect themselves 
against impoverishment and exploitation. Further, making the best of a bad 
situation doesn't necessarily improve the situation itself--a point which seems 
to have been clearer to some Tanzanian peasants than to their interpreters. As 
one elderly informant told a researcher from Dar es Salaam, who was soliciting 
his recollections of the Maji Maji rebellion, 
Not all accepted the news of maji. But those who did not suffered as 
well. The Maji Maji warriors hated and killed them, and the German 
askari did not discriminate - he killed every African he came across, 
This was similar to TANU. Some have joined, others have not, but we 
are all independent. Is this not so? (Gwassa & Iliffe) 
Not.all writers in the neoclassical tradition run afoul-of the fallacies of 
composition and/or functionalism. Much of the non-marxist literature on economic 
development takes the more cautious, and pessimistic, position that capitalism 
is progressive only if and when it_ it properly managed, Writers from W,A, 
Lewis to Michael Lipton have predicated much of their work on the belief that 
capitalist development is inherently (and undesirably) inegalitarian and, 
furthermore, that underdeveloped economies face problems which the market 
cannot solve. The indivisibility of many types of infrastructure and directly 
productive capital, the interdependence of production and consumption, not to· 
mention intermediate and final goods, and the severe shortages of productive 
skills and managerial experience typical of underdeveloped economies - all form 
, 
the conceptual cornerstones of the belief that economies cannot develop without 
government intervention and, often, foreign assistance as well. The whole gener-
·ation of development plans, international aid and technical assistance schemes, 
and state projects and enterprises which emerged during the World Bank's first 
two·Development Decades grew out of such ideas. 
With experience, the nee-Keynesian generation of development economists have 
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become painfully aware that the evident need for state intervention in under-
developed economies is no guarantee of effective policy performance. The failures 
and disappointments of the first Development Decade gave rise to a veritable 
flood of neopopulist criticism. Such standbys of liberal development strategy 
as import-substituting industrialization, agricultural settlement schemes, 
subsidized credit, the Green Revolution, expanded educational opportunites 
and many others were all shown to have aggravated many of the problems they were 
supposed to "solve" -- and created new ones as well. (Lipton; Lele; Griffin; 
Chenery; and many others.) Some discouraged developers retreated into neo-
~lassical fundamentalism, arguing for wholesale dismantling of government efforts 
to control both domestic and foreign transactions (Healey; Little, et al.; Meier); 
others, more fully persuaded of the fallacies of laissez-faire, keep searching 
for better policies. Irrigation, land reform, agricultural price supports, 
progressive taxation, export subsidies and appropriate technology have all enjoyed 
considerable vogue as policies designed to avoid the costs of unrestrained 
capitalism by spreading the benefits, if not to the elusive "bottom 40%" of the 
world's poor, then at least more equitably among the upper three-fifths. But 
these policies have hardly proved more effective than their predecessors. 
Redistributive land reform, for example, is in principle an ideal way to have 
growth and equality too: by redistributing an essential agricultural resource 
from large holders who often lease it out or leave it idle, to peasants who tend 
to cultivate it themselves, using labor-intensive techniques "appropriate" to 
LDC factor endowments, land reform contributes to economic efficiency as well 
as equality. (Lipton) In practice, it does not always work out that way. In 
Kenya, .for example, many large European-owned farms were subdivided and transferred 
to African ownership after independence. However, much of this land has appar-
ently been acquired by relatively well-to-do Africans, who either live and work 
in the urban sector and often hold their land idle for speculative purposes, or 
who are farming it in units of ten acres .or more on which they have encountered 
significant financial and/or managerial problems. (Heyer, et al.) Thus, 
redistribution of land in the former White Highlands cannot be said to have 
contributed significantly either to agricultural growth or to economic equality. 
In the former African Reserves, consolidation of holdings and registration of 
. titles promoted under the Swynnerton Plan also contributed more to rural in-
equality than to economic growth. The consolidators tended to be people who 
already possessed the means to buy additional land (Okoth-Ogendo), while 
with hindsight it seems likely that the initial success of 
the Swynnerton Plan was not due to the process of consolidation 
and registration per se, but rather to the final removal of 
restrictions on cash crops and the provision of the necessary 
resources to grow them. (Smith) 
The Kenyan experience appears to bear out that of Mexico, Peru and other 
countries: by itself, redistribution of land ownership neither prevents the 
development of capitalist relations of production in agriculture, nor mitigates 
their tendency·to generate rural differentiation over time. (Lehmann) 
The fundamental analytical.flaw in the neo-Keynesians' search for the 
appropriate policy package lies in their fa.ilure to devleop any analysis of the 
politic,, of development and underdevelopment. Schumpeter's (1940) fundamental 
insight -- that capitalist development has political as well as economic con-
sequences--has been all but ignored by the mainstream of liberal writing on 
economic development. If governments are compelled by the logic of market 
interdependence, indivisible investments and economies of scale to intervene 
in the deve1opment process, they should try to be nice about it; if they aren't 
this is attributed to flaws in either the training or the characters of the officials 
involved. Resource allocation by the household or the firm has been the subject 
of hundreds of studies, but res·ource allocation by the state is assumed to be 
governed by factors outside the conventional domain of economic analysis and 
hence is treated as exogenous to the economic process. While the naive version 
of this approach is not without its liberal critics, the latter have done little 
to advance the issue--beyond the dubious step of appealing to Political Science 
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for help. Dudley Seers' suggestive outline of the political as well as the 
economic consequences of persistent LDC balance of payments deficits, which 
first appeared in the Economic Bulletin of Ghana in 1963, has not been followed 
up, even in its original country of publication. After several years as an 
economic advisor to successive Ghanaian regimes, Douglas Rimmer (1969) concluded 
bitterly that any resemblence between development plans and economic performance 
was purely coincidental. However, he did not carry the analysis beyond repri-
manding his colleagues for their "abstraction from politics"--while Tony Killick 
(1978), despite the advantage of additional hindsight, can only lament that 
people as nice as his Ghanaian counterparts should have become mired in such 
a hopeless economic mess. It has been left to the marxists to try to sort out 
the politics of capitalism and underdevelopment in postcolonial Africa--a 
challenge they have sometimes taken up with more enthusiasm than lucidity. 
;'Capitalism is bad for you, especially on the periphery of the world economy" 
The obverse of neoclassical optimism about the progressive potential of 
capitalism in the Third World is the argument first advanced by A.G. Frank, and 
popularised for Africanists by Rodney, Wallerstein and Amin, that the under-
development of African economies is the direct consequence of their incorporation 
into the World Capitalist System (hereinafter WCS). By forcing the masses of 
Africa into production of primary commodities for the world market on terms 
unfavorable to themselves, the (largely European) center of the WCS has drawn 
African economies into a process of underdevelopment. The capital invested in 
1 Africa-based production is controlled by foreigners; the African masses provide 
cheap commodities for the markets of.the center; and African elites constitute a 
1
The limited impact of nationalization of business assets on corporate 
. policies in Africa has led several writers to point out that control of production 
itself, rather than ownership of the means of .production, is the crucial issue. 
Shivji;' Teriba. 
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comprador class of bureaucrats and corporate functionaries who enjoy some of 
the material comforts of the international bourgeoisie in exchange for imple-
menting the latter's strategies for surplus extraction and labor control at 
the periphery. Africans cannot accumulate because they do not control the 
surplus value created by their own labor, nor can they withdraw from the WCS 
because they have become economically dependent on it. Under these circumstances, 
such forms of capitalist enterprise as may be observed in Africa are either 
directly controlled by outsiders, or disarticulated from the local economy 
in such a way as to stifle. their own internal development. In short, the 
WCS operates to keep African accumulation.primitive. 
The sweeping generality of early statements of the dependency thesis provoked 
justificable criticism: it was attacked as linear, economistic and overly 
general; and radical scholars sought to develop more detailed and precise 
analyses of different forms of dependency, accumulation and exploitation, and 
their impact on the precapitalist societies of Africa. Much of this literature 
elaborates the dependency thesis rather than transcending it. Meillas soux's 
(1972) argument, for example, that the redistributive solidarity of precapitalist 
African communities provided a mechanism of self-exploitation which foreign 
capital has profited from by preserving, is a refinement rather than a reformu~ 
lation of Amin's assertion that under colonial exploitation, 
traditional society ('s) ••• main function was to produce for the 
world market under conditions which, because they impoverished 
it, deprived the members of any prospect of radical modernization •••• 
as a dependent society it was complete, peripheral and at a dead end. 
It consequently retained certain 'tradtional' appearances which 
constituted its .only means of survival. (Amin, 1972) 
The same concept has been applied to the bantustans of South Africa lWolpe; 
Legassick), contributing to a picture of South African development as a case 
of internal colonialism. The white minority in South africa has enriched itself, 
in this view, not by reproducing the process of accumu.lation on a national scale 
typical of western Europe and the other British dominions, but rather by creating 
a microcosm of the WCS itself, with a center which is reproducing the conditions 
of its own accumulation by alienating the African majority--legally as well as 
economically. In similar vein, Leys (1975) argued that in postcolonial Kenya, 
"tr·ibalism was a natural form of consciousness" which both aggravated and obscured 
class antagonisms. For the dominant class, "appeals to tribal solidarity" 
served 
the double purpose of reinforcing the Kikuyu leadership's 
position at the center, and repelling challenges based on 
class antagonism within Kikuyu society. (205) 
So long as accumulation at the periphery of the WCS remains relatively 
primitive, the peripheral bourgeoisie is condemned to a marginal and unprogressive 
historical role. Whether in or out of the bureaucracy, wealthy Africans have 
made their fortunes by dealing in scarce commodities and/or means of production 
rather than by developing the productive forces of their economies, and often 
resort to political repression to protect their privileges against the demands 
and discontents pf the masses. Both the class and its members have been thoroughly 
castigated by Third World radicals, from Frantz Fanon to Issa Shivji. Even those 
content to travel the capitalist road itself bemoan the unproductive investment 
strategies and wasteful managerial practices of Africa's "drone capitalists". 
{Akeredolu-Ale; cf., Kilby; Joseph) For proponents of the dependency thesis, 
such conduct follows logically from the peripherality of African economies. 
Dependent on the center of the WCS for his education, his standard of living, 
even his nominal independence, what can the African civil servant, politician 
or businessman be expected to do but become a parasite, a petty tyrant or an 
' ,.,, / 
oyinbodudu? 
Viewed in such terms, the African bourgeois appears a stereotype--a char-
acter fully delineated by the structure of the socio-economic system in which he 
finds himself. (Memmi; Fanon). By the same token, the African bourgeoisie is 
relegated to a· passive historical role: it does not act as a class (in or for 
itself), but only reacts to the commands of foreign capital and "metropolitan" 
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regimes. Because of its dependence, peripheral society is administered by the 
bureaucracy (acting as agents of the metropolitan bourgeoisie) rather than ruled 
by an authentic bourgeoisie of its own. (Amin, 1972; cf. Alavi, Saul, von Freyhold.) 
According to the logic of this view, class formation in the periphery is not 
a process of collective conceptualization and action arising out of the tensions 
and contradictions of capitalist accumulation, but simply a product of the world 
capitalist machine. Class struggle as a dynamic force has no place in the history 
of the periphery. 
"Capitalism, like adolescence, is inevitable and necessary" 
A number of marxists have objected strongly to the notion that African, or 
other Third World societies are mere end products of a mechanistic global process, 
without_a historical dynamic of _their own. While not denying the importance of 
Africa's dependence on foreign markets, foreign capital and the institutions 
(states, multinational corporations, international agencies) which control them, 
marxists have argued that Africans also accumulate, on their own as well as 
their creditors' account, and hence exert a degree of independent influence on 
the development of their own_societies. There is not space in this essay for 
a comprehensive review of this literature, but a few of its main tendencies 
may be mentioned briefly. One approach has been to try to develop models of 
the process and consequences of the "articulation" of capitalist and precapitalist 
modes of production (hereinafter AMP)- a discussion unusually productive of 
turgid prose and functionalist argument (Wolpe, 1980 is full of examples,) 
Part of the problem lies in the concept of mode of production itself. As 
a descriptive term, "mode of production" is useful as a general reminder of the 
interrelatedness of the economic, political and ideological aspects of historical 
processes, but it doesn't lend itself readily to more precise conceptualization 
of .the dynamics of social change. As Foster-Carter reminds us, 
It is already one level of abstration to have 'classes' (rather than 
'people') as the subject ·of history' but to endow so conceptual an 
entity as 'mode of production' with this role is idealism indeed, 
As modes of production are not the subject of history, so neither 
should they be the subject of sentences. (55) 
Once locked into a notion of mode of production as "an articulated com~ 
bination of the forces and relations of production," (Hindess & Hirst) it is 
not easy to see how to get things moving, analytically speaking, except perhaps 
by disarticulation--a term whose connotation of disconnected or disassembled 
parts isn't especially conducive to dynamic argument. In one of the most systematic 
attempts to apply the concept of articulation to an African "problematic", 
., 
Dupre and Rey attack Bohannon and Dalton's notion that exchange brought about 
fundamental changes in the character of indigenous African economies: 
For four centuries the goods produced by Eurpean capitalism 
of different epochs have been absorbed by the lineage system: •.• 
have ••• played an important part in the reproduction of the lineage 
mode of production ... ; by contrast, these goods have not advanced 
an inch the appearance of the capitalist mode of production in the 
social formations concerned. (Wolpe, p. 157) 
But it is hard to see the advantage of their alternative explanation: 
It was necessary to introduce a rupture so that the 
capitalist mode of production could develop alongside 
the lineage mode of production and against it. This 
rupture turns out to be an independent mode of production 
which was neither capitalism nor the lineage mode of pro-
duction; this mode of production remains dominant so long as 
conditions of the normal development of capitalism are not 
fulfilled. (Idem.) 
Neither they, nor most other contributors to the literature on AMP, have yet 
offered a systematic explanation of how one mode comes to dominate another. 
(cf,, Foster-Carter) 
Disillusionment with AMP has revived interest in some of the simpler and 
more powerful concepts in marxist analysis--accumulation and class stn,ggle, 
Warren's (1973) celebrated challenge to the dependency school, in which he argued 
for the presence as well as the possibility of capitalist accumulation and 
industrial development in third world economies, has been taken up by Africanists 
newly alert to the productive potential of domestically-based enterprise, For 
example Swainson (1978), while doubting Warren's assertion that Third World 
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countries "can become technically independent of advanced capitalism," none-
theless sees the role of national capital in Kenya as "complementary and con-
tradictory" rather than compl·etely ·subordinate to that of international capital. 
(p.377) She has evidently succeeded in converting Colin Leys, who recently 
(1978) renounced his own previous characterization of the Kenyan ruling class 
as a "comprador" bourgeoisie in favor of a more "orthodox" marxist view, which 
emphasizes"the key role of the class formed out of the process of indigenous 
capital accumulation" in explaining Kenyan economic growth since 1940. (247) 
The "discovery" of an autonomous African bourgeoisie parallels, in a sense, 
marxists' earlier efforts to trace the formation of an African working class. 
Growing out of debates over Arrighi's (1970) provocative thesis that fully 
proletarianized workers constituted the "aristocracy" of Africa's laboring classes, 
a substantial literature developed in the 196O's and early i7o•s, on the history 
of industrial labor relations and the rise of working class consciousness in 
a number of colonial and postcolonial African societies. (S~e, e.g., Cohen & 
Sandbrook, and Cohen & Gutkind.) On the whole, African workers have proved 
able and willing to protest exploitation and/or unfair treatment by their 
employers: these studies record numerous· examples of workers' consciousness 
of their own exploitation and ability to act collectively to improve the terms 
of their employment. It is more difficult to find clear-cut evidence of broader-
based class consciousness among the poor, or of organizational alliances among 
industrial workers and the majority of peasants, artisans, petty traders or what 
has been rather inelegantly termed the "lumpe.nsalaria:t"-. (F. Hill) Predictions 
of growing solidarity and/or militance among the mass of Africa's producers 
are often based on conjecture rather than evidence, or have been contradicted 
by subsequent events. (Williams; Gutkind, Bernstein) People can be found in 
most African countries who fit the "bourgeois" or "proletarian" categories, but 
it does not follow that their interests and/or influence have yet come to dominate 
the course of African development or political conflict. On the contrary, 
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both in terms of the numbers of people involved and in ter!'IS of their importance 
for contemporary processes of economic and political change, it may be argued · 
that the mutual dependence and antagonism between peasants and the state occupy 
a more central position in many parts of postcolonial Africa than do the struggles 
between capital and labor. 
"Capitalists make their own history, but not exactly as they please ••• " 
In an effort to avoid the deterministic tendencies of both the dependency 
thesis and "orthodox" marxist explanations of African underdevelopment, some 
recent literature re-emphasizes the value of concrete historical studies. On 
one level, this approach departs from the simple point that since all sociaJ_ 
change takes place in specific historical circumstances, the analysis of social 
history·cannot be divorced from·social realities. Such a view informs Leys' 
(1978) argument, for example, that Petras and others miss the point when they 
criticize Warren for documenting his thesis with "special cases". Citing Marx 
on Britain, Leys points out that all actual cases are "special": "How else, but 
through ·such 'systematically combined moments' (of primitive accumulation) occurring 
in some particular place, could capitalist developmen:t ••• ever occur?"(243) And 
Ranger argues forcefully that the .study of African peasants should follow the l'ines 
suggested by Brenner in his work on European agrarian history, which emphasizes 
"the degree to which patterns of development or underdevelopment for an entire 
epoch might hinge upon the outcome of specific processes of class formation, of 
class struggle." (Quoted in Ranger, 1978,125) 
Studying accumulation in the context of colonial and postcolonial African 
history brings us face to face with the issue of the state and its relationship 
to _the accumulating classes. Leys warns against departing from orthodox marxism 
on this point: "in noting the important role of the state in facilitating this 
movement of African capital out of circulation and into production, we must avoid 
the mistake of attributing to it an independeq.t role" as either a public spirited 
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"modernizing bureaucracy" or a "mediator between foreign .... and local capital." 
(Leys, 1978, 251) But surely one need not attribute altruism, or even impartiality, 
to a social group in order to assign it a measure of independence. Indeed, 
much of the recent debate over whether the post-colonial state is merely an 
instrument of the dominant elass--foreign or domestie--or a group of specialized 
functionaries more or less independent of any class alignments seems rather 
overdrawn. Lonsdale & Berman (1978;1980) adopt a more useful approach when they 
describe the colonial state in Kenya as attempting to cope with a series of 
crises and contradictions of both their own and others' making. In attempting, 
e.g., to maintain social order in the face of settler accumulation, or to 
mobilize African labor for European use without reducing African production, 
the colonial state created new tensions and crises, which it was often forced 
to contain through incr_easingly interventionist or repressive policies, In 
this ease, Lonsdale and Berman argue, the colonial state emerges as neither an 
instrument nor an actor in the class struggle, but as the arena in which this 
struggle occurs--"the resume of society", to use Marx's phrase. 
For the colonial period, this paradigm is apt. But with the onset of 
decolonization, things become a little more complicated. Certainly the Africans 
who rook over the reins of power from the departing colonialists represented 
different classes or class interests within their own societies--merchants, 
landowners, wealthy peasants, labor union leaders, etc.--and, to an extent, have 
continued to play out conflicts among these interests within the arena of the 
state. At the same time, however, the continued dependence of African economies 
on foreign capital, markets and technology has meant that those who control 
the postcolonial st'ate also control access to a significant portion of the economic 
resources-- the means of production and accumulation-~of the domestic economy, 
and therefore share a common interest in maintaining control of the state in 
order to secure and reproduce the conditions of their own accumulation, To the 
extent that members of the governing group stand in a given relation to crucial 
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resources, and share a common interest in protecting and extending that relation, 
they may be expected to act as a class. To the extent that they also represent, 
or are controlled by, other classes, they also tend to act in pursuit or defense 
of those interests. The results are likely to be varying and contradictory--a 
fact which may help to explain not only why postcolonial states are so inter-
ventionist with regard to the domestic economy, but also why their explicit 
efforts to control, direct or accelerate the direction and pace of economic 
change have often proved so ineffective. 
Agrarian crises: the state of the African peasantry in the postcolonial era 
To illustrate the point that processes of development and underdevelopment 
in contemporary Africa may be usefully understood as outcomes of specific 
conjunctures of conflicts and alliances among classes within, outside of and 
including the state, I will focus in this final section on some recent develop-
ments in African agriculture. My choice reflects not only the truism that the 
majority of Africans are farmers--or depend on agriculture for a major source 
of their livelihood--but also the critical importance of agriculture in the 
development process itself. Not only are African societies "growing from the(ir 
agrarian) roots", but the overall process of socio-economic change is also 
constrained in important ways by the pace and character of agrarian development. 
Partly because the agrarian sector occupies a central place in most African 
pot:itical _economies it has been the focus of a number of recent_ efforts_ tc, __ analyze 
African development in historical perspective. 
Food shortages, failed development schemes and rural poverty - so prevalent 
in African eocnomies today - can't be blamed in any direct sense either on the 
spread of rural capitalism or the lack of it. Rural commercialization has 
certainly occurred, albeit unevenly, and served in Africa as elsewhere to generate 
agricultural- growth and rural differentiation .. Peasants' involvement in pro-
duction for the market has been even more widespread than was once thought: 
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in addition to well-known cases of colonial export growth effected by peasant 
producers (in, e.g., Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda), evidence is accumulating of the 
early development of peasant agriculture elsewhere, including areas such as • 
Kenya and South Africa where it was later choked off by deliberate state inter-
vention, or superseded by other forms of agricultural enterprise or by non-
agricultural growth. (Bundy; Lonsdale; Hay; Young; Forbes Munro) Development 
arising from expanded market opportunities for smallholding farmers has often 
been uneven - characterised both by commodity imbalances between, e.g., staple 
food and export crops, and by socio-economic differentiation. (Heyer, et al.; 
Cruise O'Brien; GBD; Klein) But commercialization and the accompanying development 
of capitalist relations of agricultural production--labor hire, land lease and 
purchase, accumulation--are not sufficient to explain variations in either the 
overall rate of agricultural change or the degree of rural inequality. The 
Leninist model, which argues that as capitalism penetrates the countryside, it 
gives rise to the division of rural society into bourgeoisie (kulak) and 
proletariat, isn't su£fiC:ient to account for African experience. (Lenin) Peasants' 
ability to take advantage of, market opportunities depends, of course, on their 
access to resources which, in turn, depends on more than market opportunities 
and constraints. Commercial accumulation is one, but not the only, source of 
rural differentiation in contemporary Africa. 
It is not just a matter of resuscitating Chayanov, either. The composition 
of a peasant household is, to be sure, one determinant of its productive 
capacity (Hill; Hunt), but it is not the only one, nor is household compostion 
itself a purely biological phenomenon. One advocate of the importance of 
demographic differentiation and the absence of classes in rural Africa is 
Polly Hill. Her research in rural Hausaland certainly shows that the age and sex 
structure of a rural household can be crucial in determinfng the factor endowments 
of the associated peasant farming enterprise, but the communities she studied 
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also demonstrate the importance of extra-household relations of power and property 
for determining economic inequality. Among the majority of peasant households 
in one village, for example, differences in cultivated land and hence, output 
were closely associated with demographic factors, but the wealthiest households 
in the village--a small minority of .the total--were distinguished from the rest 
by their personal and political ties to the state or to sources of wealth and 
power outside the village 
In similar vein, Diana Hunt (1979) concluded from a laborious 12 month 
survey of 23 households in one impoverished 'village in eastern Kenya, that the 
virtual absence of hired labor and relative insignificance of agricultural 
sales lent qualified support to a Chayanovian view of Kenyan peasants as farmers 
who allocate resources according to non-market considerations. Her data do 
not, however, bear out Chayanov's conclusion that differences in income among 
peasant households result primarily from demographic rather than economic influences. 
In Hunt's village, households with an educated head averaged almost twice the 
income of those headed by illiterates--not because educated peasants were better 
farmers, but because they had access to off-farm employment which was virtually 
the only source of cash income in the region.· Indeed,.Hunt's description of the 
regional economy strongly suggests that the absence of market activity in her 
village was a sign of poverty, rather than of peasant preference or indifference 
to market opportunity. In general, given the fluidity of household structures 
associated with such common African practices as polygyny, child fostering and 
clientage, demographic differention is as likely to be a consequence as a cause 
of differences in ruraL households' income and wealth. 
Colonial rule not only initiated (or intensified) the spread of commerciali-
zation and capitalist relations of production in much of ruraL Africa, but also 
established new forms of political domination in place or on top of existing 
ones. Colonial regimes sought to secure conditions favorable to capitalist 
accumulation as well as to maintain order cheaply; in the process, they regularly 
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confronted social tensions or crises which they tended to "resolve" through 
increased intervention in the colonial economy. Lonsdale and Berman have shown 
that the colonial state in Kenya was often torn between the conflicting interests 
of its constituents, or confronted with the contradictory effects of its own 
policies. With respect to agriculture, for example, the conflict between en-
couraging peasant production (for domestic consumption and/or export) and, 
at the same time, "forcing out" cheap labor to meet the demands of foreign 
enterprise and of the state itself was usually handled through increased state 
intervention, in forms ranging from official exhortations (e.g., not to "neglect" 
subsistence production) to pass books, forced labor and expropriation of 
agricultural land. In West Africa, peasants' discontent with the vicissitudes 
of crop prices--which they often blamed, not without reason, on the monopolistic 
practices of foreign trading companies--was countered by the establishment of 
statutory marketing boards, while in eastern and central Africa, similar 
measures were employed to calm European settlers' fears of "unfair competition" 
from African farmers. 
In the postcolonial period, state intervention in the agrarian sector has 
generally increased. African regimes have often surpassed their colonial pre-
decessors in efforts to control rural markets and relations of production. 
While redistributive land reform has not been common (apart from, e.g., the 
former white highlands of Kenya or the estates of southern Ethiopia (Hiwet; 
Leys, 1975; Sorrenson), African governments have sought to regulate the terms 
of access to rural land. Registration of titles in Kenya, villagization in 
Tanzania, or the outright declaration of st'3.te owner.ship. of land in Nigeria 
are a few examples. Also, in many African economies, ·the stite is the principal 
supplier of improved agricultural inputs as well as of rural infrastructure and 
subsidized agricultural credit. 
Often, the very multiplicity of government programs and regulations exacerbates 
the scarcities and uncertainties of small-scale farming: subsidized inputs aren't 
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available on time, cash crops can't actually be sold at favorable terms, etc. 
Moreover, the contradictory nature of the state's interest in agriculture remains: 
governments want expanding output of both food and export crops, increased rural 
incomes and employment opportunities, but tend to allocate resources at the 
national level so as to undermine these goals. The rapid expansion of state 
power and personnel, and the concentration of wealth and power in the hands 
of those who hold top bureaucratic or political positions, have contributed 
to the rapid growth of the tertiary sector in Africa. (World Development 
Reports) In addition to the growth of the bureaucracy itself, upper class 
consumption generates substantial demand for both public and private services: 
roads, water, electricity and teleconnnunications are provided (for the areas 
in which the upper classes live and work) by the state and construction, retail-
ing and·repair services by small-scale private enterprise. •Income-earning 
opportunities in the urban sector provide alternatives to agricultural employ-
ment and investment, which attract both rural emigrants and rural savings. 
(Essang & Mabawonku; Lagemann; Norman; Rempel & House; Sabot) High rates of 
rural-urban migration in Africa reflect not only the political power of urban 
wage earners (Harris & Todaro) and the profit-maximizing behavior of foreign 
investors (Rempel & House; Sabot), but also the political structure of the state 
itself and its effects on the structure of demand and employment. 
The tendency for both human and financial resources to flow out of agriculture 
is accentuated in Africa by the importance of education, both as a prerequisite 
for service sector employment and as a condition for access to power itself. 
Schooling is, of course, a precondition for administrative, professional and 
clerical employment, and is becoming increasingly important in small-scale 
enterprise as well. (Berry, in progress; King) Part of what Asian peasants 
spend to acquire rights to cultivable land, Africans devote to education in order 
to ·increase their children's chances of entering sectors of expanding opportunity. 
(Essang & Mabawonku; Foster; Weinrich) In addition, political power in independent 
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African nations tends to be concentrated in the hands of educated people. 
Partly because of their limited numbers, Africans with secondary or higher 
education rose rapidly to prominence and power after independence, as civil 
servants, elected officials or senior military officers. Independent regimes 
tended, in turn, to reinforce and perpetuate the power of educated people both 
through criteria for recruitment into the government and through educated officials' 
preference for dealing with educated peopie outside of it. In awarding contracts, 
appointing chiefs, ·making loans and disseminating extension advice, numerous 
studies have shown that bureaucrats prefer to deal with the better off ·and the 
better educated members of local communities. (Essang; Heyer; _et al.; Leonard; 
Weinrich) This appears to be as true under socialist as under capitalist-
oriented regimes: ujamaa villages in Tanzania, for example, have re-created 
many of the tensions between peasants and bureaucrats which helped to precipitate 
the forced collectivization of Soviet agriculture in 1929. (Hill; Raikes; Shanin; 
Thaden van Velzen) While formal education may not be necessary to enable farmers 
to learn how to use improved inputs, it often determines whether or not they 
have access to them. 
Expanded state power and employment, urban growth and educational stratification 
are processes common to most postcolonial Africa societies, but their economic 
consequences vary from one country or region to another. This is particularly 
evident in the case of agriculture where postcolonial state intervention is 
often superimposed on patterns of commercialization and differentiation initiated 
during the colonial period, producing processes of rural change which defy easy 
generalization. In Kenya, for example, government policy since 1955 has sought 
both to expand opportunities for the peasantry and to preserve the supposed 
economic advantages of the large farm sec·tor. (Heyer, et al,; cf., Brett, Leys) 
In the former African reserves, peasants were encouraged to register and con-
solidate their land holdings, while in the highlands land was transferred from 
European to African ownership after independence in both large and small tracts, 
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Evidence on changing patterns of landholding in postcolonial Kenya is far 
from comprehensive, but it appears that a good deal of rural land has been 
acquired by urban dwellers who had either private capital to invest in land 
purchase, or preferential access to state loans for the same purpose. Those 
wno have acquired large holdings of rural land rarely cultivate it themselves, 
prefering to hold it idle for speculative purposes, to lease it out to tenant 
farmers, or in the case of some large farms to employ expatriate managers. Many 
of the large farms have suffered from undercapitalization and inexperienced 
management, and have required continued state subsidies to keep afloat. (Heyer) 
The growth of peasant production--from less than 20% of marketed agricultural 
output in the mid-1950's to nearly BU% by 1975--has, by contrast, exceeded even 
the most optimistic expectations of government officials. How far the performance 
of the peasant sector can be attributed to state policy is, however, another 
question. 
Liberal economists have been inclined to attribute the growth of small-
Holder agriculture in Kenya to the triumph of market incentives over often 
ill-conceived or poorly managed state development schemes. (Heyer; Smith) 
Radical writers have countered with the argument that the middle peasantry, 
like the urban "informal" sector, is neither rich nor technologically advanced 
and that its expansion serves the interests of both internationa.L capital and the 
Kenyan state too well not to have been the result of deliberate capitalist 
strategy. Citing evidence that the growth of milk and tea sales by peasant 
households in Central Province has been accompanied by a slight decrease in 
the inequality of household incomes, Cowen (1976) has suggested that the World 
Bank deliberately fostered the expansion of the middle peasantry in postcolonial 
Kenya to counteract the growing power of the Kenyan bourgeoisie. And Leys (1975) 
points out that the extent that peasant expansion has been subsidized by the state, 
the ruling elite has been more than compensated by the resulting increases 
in both domestic supplies of agricultural commodities and export earnings. 
However, it is far from clear that the growth of smallholder production 
in Kenya has resulted directly from state development efforts. Apart from the 
well-known failings of many rural development schemes (Heyer, et al.), recent 
evidence suggests that much of the expansion of peasant agriculture has been 
financed by rural emigrants employed in the formal urban sector, whose remit-
tances to their rural relatives provide the chief source of working capital 
for many peasant households. (Collier & Lal) Access to formal sector employment 
is, in turn, closely correlated with education. lcf. Hunt) Peasant accumulation, 
in other words, has depended in no small degree on the growth of an urban pro-
letariat while, by the same token, one of the principal causes of rural indebtedness 
has been expenditure on education. Thus, sellers of rural land often turn out 
to be poor peasants who have gone into debt to finance their children's schooling. 
Once their land is sold, however, they do not remain "at home" as full-time 
agricultural laborers but often migrate to the large farm areas as squatters, 
or to the semi-arid regions where they compete with equally impoverished pastoral 
nomads for some of Kenya's poorest land. (Collier and Lal; cf., Wambaa and King) 
In short, the differentiating effects of agricultural commercialization appear 
to have been accentuated not only by the effects of state policies towards 
agriculture itself, but also by patterns of urban growth and educational stratifi-
cation, which have in turn been fostered by the practices of Kenya's ruling class. 
Rural commercialization and differentiation have not, however, been associated 
with the development of full-fledged capitalist relations of production in Kenyan 
agriculture. Rather, the expansion of smallholder agriculture in Kenya has 
been flanked, as it were, by the emergence of a class of large landowners and 
by the progressive marginalization of the rural poor. Since many of the land-
owners are absentee and the landless often emigrate, the differentiation associated 
with the recent pattern of agricultural expansion is not fully visible within 
those peasant communities where commer ,.cialization is most pervasive, Similarly, 
the sources of peasant accumulation are not internal to the agricultural sector, 
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but lie rather in the growth of the urban economy and the educational system 
in Kenya as a whole. Viewed in its national context, the postcolonial ren-
aissance of the Kenyan middle peasantry appears neither as an engine of market-
based growth nor as a mere creature of the World Capitalist System, but rather 
as the historically specific. outcome of efforts by both peasants and t.he state 
to capitalise on opportunities and to cope with constraints arising out of their 
dealings with the WCS, with the local environment and with one another. 
Elsewhere in Africa, commercialization and state intervention have been 
equally important for the pace and structure of agrarian change, but have combined 
in different ways. In western Nigeria, to cite another well-documented case, 
the colonial regime did not have to cope with the demands of European settlers 
and, accordingly, did less to stifle peasant production for the market. However, 
the development of rural capitalism was not unaffected either by colonial 
policy or by local conditions. Both the colonial state and the structure of 
the colonial economy placed limits on the development of agricultural capitalism. 
Colonial officials were as concerned with maintaining order in Nigeria as they 
were in Kenya, and viewed with alarm agrarian developments which threatened to 
destabilize rura.L society - such as farmers' tendency to "neglect" food crops 
in favor of cocoa. Disputes over rural land were handled by the Native Courts, 
so that customary rules of tenure and inheritance helped to prevent tor at least 
to slow down)the emergence of freehold tenure and the concentration of land-
holdings and agricultural wealth. (Berry, 1975) The colonial regime also did 
nothing to check the consolidation of monopoly power among foreign firms which 
controlled export marketing; accordingly, African traders were relegated to an 
intermediate role·in the export trade. Thus, while opportunities for indigenous 
accumulation were greater in trade and transport than in agriculture itself, 
they were limited even there. 
The strains and contradictions of the colonial economy gave rise to increasing 
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state intervention, When the monopolistic practices of the trading firms threatened 
to provoke organized peasant resistance, the colonial regime took direct control 
of export trade. This practice was maintained after independence, both facil-
itating state extraction of surplus value from peasant agriculture and provoking 
a series of confrontations between peasants and various agents of the state 
over the rate of exploitation. The economic and political consequences of these 
confrontations have not, however, exactly borne out the expectations of either 
neoclassical or marxist writers. (Bauer; Williams) Marketing board policies 
did not prevent a threefold increase in western Nigerian cocoa production 
between the mid-fifties and the early 197U's--nor has peasant consciousness 
of state exploitation given rise to an effort to join forces with other oppressed 
or exploited segments of western Nigerian society to overthrow the existing 
order. For, at the same time that state control of export marketing served 
to heighten peasants' awareness of their common economic interests, the growth 
of educational opportunities and the urban sector provided Yoruba peasants 
with an alternative route to upward mobility which they embraced with all the 
avidity and enterprise that they had initially devoted to cocoa. Peasants 
protested against reduced cocoa prices and higher taxes not, as Gavin Williams 
t1976) has suggested, because they were committed to being peasants, but in 
order to increase their ability to move out of agriculture--either by investing 
directly in trade, transport, etc., or by educating their children for non-
agricultural emp'ioyment. (Berry, in progress) 
The rapid growth of petroleum exports in recent years has tended to acceler-
ate the disappearance of the Yoruba peasantry. To be sure, oil has all but 
eliminated one o.f the principal sources of conflict between Yoruba peasants 
and the state, by drastically reducing the importance of agricultural revenues 
as a source of state income, However, although the cocoa price was allowed 
to rise 350% between 1971 and 1978, both the cost of living and the cost of 
agricultural labor rose even faster, Oil-generated demand led to rapidly 
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escalating inflation, and expanding opportunities for employment or self-· 
employment in construction, repair and distributive services rose pari passu 
with state and elite consumption. Emigration from agriculture has accelerated, 
and investment in education--the sine qua non for accumulation in an economy 
increasingly controlled and dominated by an educated ruling class--has become 
the principal outlet for peasant savings. Furthermore, as the fiscal significance 
of peasant agriculture has dwindled, peasants' political strategies have shifted 
from combining :W.th other peasants to pressure the state for. better terms of 
trade to strengthening the effectiveness of kinship and community relations 
as channels of access to the state. 
The "disappearance" of the Yoruba peasantry is no more a sign of the vigor 
of capit.alist development in western Nigeria than the renaissance of the middle 
peasantry signifies the weakness of capitalist development in ~enya. Both economies 
are neocolonial in the sense that the rate and structure of domestic accumulation 
still depend heavily on foreign market conditions and the decisions 0£ foreign 
capital. In both countries, the state intervenes extensively in the domestic 
economy, seeking not only to appropriate surplus for the:benefitof the ruling 
classes, but also to regulate or control conditions of access to productive 
resources and often the terms of exchange as well. As a result, access to the 
state is a primary condition for indigenous accumulation and the state's in-
fluence on the structure of domestic resource allocation is extensive--if 
not always intentional. 
In such conditions, the growth tor stagnation) of agricultural production, 
the structure of rural society and the forms of peasant political action are 
all determined not only by intended state policy towards the agricultural sector, 
but also by the effects of state action on the structure of access to resources 
and opportunities throughout the economy. In both Kenya and Nigeria, the 
structure of urban employment opportunities and the importance of education 
as a condition of access to employment and to the state itself are as important 
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for peasants' strategies of investment and migration as are the prices of crops 
or the availability of agricultural inputs and credit. The differences between 
the fortunes of the Kenyan peasantry and those of their Yoruba counterparts 
in recent years are due not so much to structural differences in their respective 
political economies (which, in fact, are rather similar), but rather to differences 
in the specific conjunctures of uneven development, state intervention and 
peasant strategy whichhavedominated the agrarian histories of the two nations 
in the postcolonial era. 
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